The continuous act of correlation necessarily refers any given expression to its future conceived interpretations. Reinterpreting these sections, Peirce makes the possibility of knowledge dependent on the synthesis of impressions taken as a process explicable in its principle details. It acquires cognitive value through a set of modes of reference — quality, relation and representation, and their corresponding kinds of signification: likenesses, indices and general signs, or symbols.
These forms of mediating reference constitute consecutive steps to cover a logical distance between the multitude of impressions and a concept. The interpretant simply allows us to grasp the impressions as ours , thus replacing Kantian synthesis of apperception in self-consciousness with the idea of an intersubjective synthesis of meaning Apel , Ch. Like Hegel, Peirce interprets Kantian synthesis not as a pure self-positing Selbst-Bestimmung , but as a process of interpretation, or continuous development. In fact, for Peirce, being is representing. On the other hand, in an unnamed manuscript written in the same year, we read:.
Hegel, while regarding scientific men with disdain, has for his chief topic the importance of continuity, which was the very idea the mathematicians and physicists had been chiefly engaged in following out for three centuries. This made Hegel's work less correct and excellent in itself than it might have been; and at the same time hid its true mode of affinity with the scientific thought into which the life of the race had been chiefly laid up.
And the synthesis may be accomplished only provided it is addressed to this idea at every step. To summarize the discussed above, an interpretant, the last general term in the sequence, performs several crucial interconnected functions: 1 it makes us conceive the impressions together as being ours and, thereby 2 allows us to grasp the multitude of impressions in a totality of a concept.
Further, 3 it addresses a given expression to its further interpretation, thus 4 justifying the continuity of interpretation. Finally, unlike the preceding two, 5 it does not add any concept to the multitude of impressions, but unites the manifold directly. The role of consecutive media here is played by four different methods, those of tenacity, authority, a priori , and practical science that are needed to make this distance epistemologically irrelevant.
The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends. Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion.
We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. But we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so. W3: , And as far as there are different sorts of social practices that yield appropriate methods of reaching firm beliefs, one may choose the method which would bring the satisfaction.
The criterion is this:. To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency — by something upon which our thinking has no effect. It must be something which affects, or might affect, every man.
And, though these affections are necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. It is only the reference to the scientific method that shows the way to formation of general opinions we are fated to obtain in the long run — provided our investigation according to this method is carried sufficiently far.
At this first step any belief is nothing more than a quality in itself. To reduce this description to a simple definition, I will say that by a feeling I mean an instance of that sort of element of consciousness which is all that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else. It arises from an impulse too strong in man to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human species.
The immediacy of tenacity is replaced by a direct experience of the other. This wider social feeling allows them to see most of such laws as historical accidents, products of mere social design or public opinion manipulation. They propose the new a priori method which excludes the possibility for a belief to depend on the idiosyncratic whim of an individual or a law-like power of society: it predetermines the choice of opinion bringing it, as philosophers of a priori themselves believe, into harmony with natural causes. And in doing so, he inevitably changes the natural balance of probabilities.
Science in its pragmatist understanding, as the source of the next and final method in the list, is nothing other than an extension of this natural disposition, or a more logically complex and sophisticated expression of it. Naturally, anybody may accept false premises and come to false conclusions. In the use of scientific method reality is no longer determined by individual will, social contract, or a priori rules.
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Moreover, compared with the other three this method has one feature that is peculiar to it. It is such that any decision made on the basis of its logic is immediately connected with an ethical choice. For Peirce, it is by following this method that logic reveals itself as the ethics of intellect, and ethics as the logic of conduct. Otherwise, a person who, in using the scientific method, confesses that there is such a thing as truth, which is distinguished from falsehood simply by this, that if acted on it should, on full consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray, and then, though convinced of this, dares not know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed W3: , On the contrary, in concluding paragraphs of it Peirce concedes that the first three methods of fixing beliefs have their merits and advantages and he is careful enough not to claim unquestionable ethical superiority of scientific method over them: practical consequences are not necessarily moral ones W3: , Kant represents the logical and the ethical sides of his architectonics as a static self-positing.
As a result, the gap between the theoretical and the practical is bridged by aesthetic judgment. Peirce reinterprets Kantian syntheses as processes of continuous development, which makes it possible for the theoretical and the practical to be consistently interpreted into one another without the resort to aesthetic mediation. He incorporates aesthetics only much later, in order to provide a missing link between his normative theory, his evolutionary metaphysics, and his doctrine of categories.
Thus, it appears that Peirce ignored aesthetics at the early period of his career when Kantian influence on his thought was very strong. And vice versa, he finally acknowledged the role of aesthetics and laid the decisive emphasis on the Kantian idea of architectonics, with the problem of normativity as its starting point, at the time when, as he himself claims, he was as far from Kant as he possibly could.
Max H. It is evident that Peirce was already acquainted with Bain's theory of belief in […] but he neither develops nor applies it, and there is no trace of pragmatism.
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On the other hand, the most conspicuous doctrine of the pre-Bain theory, that all thought is in signs, is not asserted in the post-Bain theory; but it is assumed throughout. According to the pre-Bain theory, every thought interprets a previous thought and is interpreted by a subsequent thought; that is, every sign translates another and is in turn translated by still another. According to the post-Bain theory, the cognitive process has context, direction and purpose.
Thought arises in one set of circumstances and terminates in another. It starts from a doubt and ends in a belief, the essence of which is a habit or rule of action. In the pre-Bain theory, thought is identified with cognition; in the post-Bain theory, it is identified with inquiry. Fisch Of course, he also might well realize that the binary character is revealed in aesthetic judgment itself.
Now it will be observed that beauty gives the mind no particular direction or tendency — hence it can have no result either for the intellect or the will, and can help us to perform no single duty. W1: , It played a major part in deconstructing the classical picture of relations between three normative sciences and introduced a significant change into Kantian aesthetics-based symbolism.
Peirce Society , 42 2. Peirce Society , 31 2. Kloesel , eds.
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Peirce Society , 41 3. Peirce Society , 26 1.
Thomas Henry Huxley
Peirce Society , Vol. Papers of Charles S.
Peirce Society , 41 1. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4. Contents - Previous document - Next document. A Century of Influences and Interactions, vol. Vitaly Kiryushchenko. Full text PDF Send by e-mail. EP2: 5 Later on, in the period of time between the reformulation of his maxim in and the proof of pragmatism in MS , Peirce had proposed a developed, even if somewhat sketchy view on aesthetics built in the framework of his architectonics.
Third, I disagree that Christianity is undermined by evolutionary ethics. Rather, I think that foundational Christian doctrines receive support from human sociobiology in general and evolutionary ethics in particular. Thus, in contradiction to Ruse and most of his commentators, I think Christianity and evolutionary ethics can be reconciled. In the remainder of this essay, I will argue for that reconciliation, dividing the argument into four parts to coincide with four Christian issues with which Ruse and his commentators take umbrage. Those issues are the problem of evil, original sin, Christology, and the Atonement.
I begin with the problem of evil. The Problem of Evil. The problem of evil is not an empirically based problem, and therefore it is not amenable to resolution by science. Nonetheless, understanding its logic will clarify two points. First, it does not lead to atheism, as Ruse thinks. Second, the existence of original sin or of evil in the world is compatible with the existence of a benevolent God.
The problem of evil is conceptually simple and clearly logical. It is this. If God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, and if God created the universe, then, logically, the universe would contain no evil. However, the universe does contain evil in the form of undeserved suffering, at the least. Therefore, either God is not omniscient, or not omnipotent, or not omnibenevolent, or not the creator of the universe.
It is possible to argue the one point remaining, namely, that the universe really does not contain evil; certainly its containing evil is not a direct fact of observation. However, here I will accede to the general desire to stay within the bounds of common sense on this matter, and therefore I will grant that the world contains evil.
But this does not refute the existence of God. God could have left the creation to lesser beings not Christian doctrine, but held in Greek, Gnostic, and Oriental thought , or God could be very powerful but not omnipotent; knowledgeable but not omniscient; good but not omnibenevolent.
2. Objections to Naturalism
Which of the omni-characteristics to weaken is a vexed issue. Because, like Ruse, I want a real religion and a God worthy of worship, I do not want to weaken the attribute of benevolence, for I do not think that an evil God is worthy of worship. Because I am in deep sympathy with Dostoevsky's Ivan, whom Ruse invokes c , I incline to weakening God's omniscience.